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Abstract 
Three  potential  explanations  of  past  CAP  reforms  have  been  identified  in  the 
literature: a budget constraint, pressure from GATT/WTO negotiations or commitments, and 
a  paradigm  shift  emphasising  agriculture’s  provision  of  public  goods.  The  presentation, 
content  and  context  of  the  Health  Check  reform  proposals  of  2007/08  are  assessed.  The 
proposals  are  probably  more  ambitious  than  first  supposed.  The  Health  Check  was  not 
primarily driven by budget pressures; the European Commission’s wish to adopt an offensive 
negotiating stance in the closing phases of the Doha Round was a more likely explanatory 
factor.  The  EU’s  response  to  the  commodity  price  spikes  in  2008,  and  its  Health  Check 
proposals,  suggest  that  the  supposed  switch  from  a  state-assisted  policy  paradigm  to  the 
multifunctional paradigm is more apparent than real. The shape and purpose of the CAP post-
2013 is contested, with quite divergent views among the Member States 
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Until the late 1980s there was little doubt among CAP analysts that budgetary concern 
was the major driving force capable of generating CAP reform. The MacSharry reform of 
1992 triggered a debate on the driving forces of CAP reform in a new era in which farm trade 
had become more fully integrated in the WTO trade regime with its distinct Agreement on 
Agriculture. During the debate two camps crystallised - one emphasising the WTO, and the 
other the budget, as the root cause of the MacSharry reform (see Swinbank and Daugbjerg 
2006 for an overview of this debate). The debate re-emerged after the Agenda 2000 CAP 
reform but with less strength, presumably because Agenda 2000, in  general, is seen  as a 
limited reform, or perhaps rather as a simple policy adjustment.  The 2003 Fischler reform 
raised the same questions once again (see Swinbank and Daugbjerg 2006 and Cunha 2007 for 
a  discussion  of  the  driving  forces  behind  the  2003  reform).  While  the  debate  on  the 
MacSharry reform initially focussed mainly on the WTO and the budget as reform drivers, 
later  contributions  drew  attention  to  a  possible  change  of  policy  paradigm  as  the  key  to 
understanding the CAP reforms undertaken since the early 1990s. For instance Garzon (2006) 
argues that there has been a shift from the state-assisted to the multifunctional paradigm. As a 
result the CAP should be shifting its emphasis more towards the provision of public goods, 
such as environmental services.  
With the Health Check under way, debate on the driving forces behind CAP reform 
has re-emerged once again. In this paper we revisit ‘the usual suspects’ - the budget and the 
WTO - but we also consider the more recent explanation that CAP reform is driven by a 
desire to bring the policy into conformity with the multifunctional paradigm. 
The paper proceeds as follows. First we introduce the three potential drivers of reform. 
Second  we  set  the  scene  by  outlining  policy  developments  from  2003  to  2008.  Then  we 
introduce, briefly, the Health Check package, and suggest that it is rather more ambitious than 
is usually assumed. The discussion then moves on to consider the potential drivers that shaped 
and conditioned the Health Check debate, before moving to a brief conclusion. 
 
Three potential drivers of reform 
Since  the  launch  of  the  Uruguay  Round  in  1986,  CAP  reform  and  GATT/WTO 
developments have tended to progress in unison, although the sequencing of events has been 
problematic,  and  establishing  cause  and  effect  is  difficult.  Nonetheless,  there  is  some 
evidence to suggest that the MacSharry, Fischler, and 2005 sugar reforms, were prompted by 
the EU’s perception of the need to make progress in the GATT/WTO. These CAP reforms in 
turn facilitated progress in GATT/WTO: the MacSharry reforms enabled the EU to accept the 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA), the Fischler reforms allowed the EU to 
adopt  a  more  offensive  negotiating  stance  in  the  Doha  Round  (on  domestic  support  in 
particular), although at the time of writing it is too soon to say whether the Doha Round can 4 
 
be brought to a successful conclusion, and the sugar reform enabled the EU to curb its exports 
of subsidised sugar and comply with a Dispute Settlement ruling (Daugbjerg & Swinbank, 
2008 and forthcoming). Can similar WTO pressures be observed in the run-up to the Health 
Check proposals? Since the setback at the Cancún Ministerial Conference in September 2003, 
the Doha Round negotiations have suffered one crisis after another and the round is now in 
danger of de facto collapse after the failed, but intensive, negotiations in Geneva in July 2008. 
However, each intensive negotiating round has moved negotiators closer to a compromise. 
Can  the  Health  Check  be  seen  as  a  last  concession  of  the  EU  to  pave  the  way  for  an 
agriculture agreement? 
Since world market prices remained high in 2007 and well into 2008, EU expenditures 
on export subsidies and intervention purchases have been correspondingly low. At first sight 
this  may  rule  out  budgetary  pressure  as  a  likely  candidate  explaining  the  Health  Check 
proposal. However, with the 2009 debate on the Financial Perspective post-2013 in sight, high 
world market prices have prompted some ministers to question whether the EU still needs to 
support its farmers at the present level. In the US, high commodity prices were an important 
precondition for the adoption of the FAIR Act. This agricultural policy package phased out 
direct payments, albeit temporarily. So one could argue that high world market process have 
opened  a  window  of  opportunity  for  a  CAP  reform  that  would  release  funding  for  other 
purposes in the EU.  
The nature of the impact of the last candidate, paradigm change, is somewhat different 
from the two explanations discussed above. The concept of policy paradigm refers to the 
deeper layers of policy and ‘specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind of instruments 
that can be used to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to be 
addressing’ (Hall 1993, 279). Skogstad (1998) and Daugbjerg (1998, 1999) both emphasised 
the importance of paradigms in their analyses of the 1992 CAP reform. Both authors argued 
that the state-assisted (or dependent agriculture) paradigm underpinning the CAP remained 
untouched as the ideational foundation of the CAP, and argued that the fact that the paradigm 
remained unchallenged explains why the 1992 reform could not be labelled radical. In Hall’s 
(1993) notion of paradigm shift, change occurs over a relative short time and would lead to 
fundamental institutional and policy change. However, paradigm change need not necessarily 
be associated with rapid change of institutions and policy. As suggested by Coleman et al. 
(1997) when comparing policy reform processes in the Australian, Canadian and US cereals 
and dairy sectors, there may also be a ‘cumulative, negotiated, problem-solving trajectory to 
paradigm change’. Garzon (2006: 172) has suggested that previous policy reforms have not so 
much shifted the CAP from a state-assisted, or dependent agriculture, policy paradigm to the 
competitive  agriculture  paradigm,  but  instead  replaced  the  state-assisted  by  the 
multifunctional paradigm. The state-assisted paradigm rests on two fundamental principles: 
‘first, the agricultural sector contributes to national policy goals and therefore merits special 
attention; and, second, the price mechanism is a suboptimal means of achieving an efficient 5 
 
and  productive  agricultural  sector’  (Coleman  et  al.  1997  p.  275).  In  the  multifunctional 
agriculture paradigm ‘agriculture is viewed as a provider of public goods in addition to, and in 
many ways more important than its role as a producer of raw material for the food industry’ 
(Moyer and Josling, 2002, 35). Garzon (2006: 173) suggests that the ‘image of the farmer … 
evolved  towards  stewardship  of  the  environment,  as  a  reaction  against  the  negative 
environmental impacts of both the “state assisted” and “market liberal” paradigms’; and that 
‘Revenue  transfers  from  society  found  therefore  a  justification  in  the  provision  of  public 
goods’. Accepting the notion of cumulative paradigm change, it could be argued that the 
Health  Check  is  a  further  adjustment  of  the  CAP  to  bring  it  into  conformity  with  the 
multifunctional paradigm. 
 
The historical and institutional context 
The 2003 CAP reform was agreed prior to the ill-fated WTO Ministerial meeting in 
Cancún that had been seen as an important milestone in wrapping-up the Doha Round by the 
official deadline of December 2004. In adopting the package Farm Ministers said:  
This  reform  is  …  a  message  to  our  trading  partners  …  .  It  signifies  a  major 
departure  from  trade-distorting  agricultural  support,  a  progressive  further 
reduction of export subsidies, a reasonable balance between domestic production 
and preferential market access, and a new balance between internal production 
and market opening. … The CAP reform is Europe’s important contribution to the 
Doha  Development  Agenda  (DDA),  and  constitutes  the  limits  for  the 
Commission’s negotiating brief in the WTO Round. Its substance and timing are 
aimed at avoiding that reform will be designed and imposed in Cancun and/or 
Geneva  –which  could  happen  if  we  went  there  empty  handed  (Council  of  the 
European Union, 2003: 2). 
In adopting the Fischler package EU Farm Ministers mandated a review of certain 
aspects of the reformed CAP in about 2007/08, long after the scheduled completion of the 
Doha Round. For example Article 64(3) of Regulation 1782/2003 provided for a review of the 
partial  decoupling  option  in  the  Single  Payment  Scheme  (SPS).
1  The  2003  package  was 
quickly followed in 2004 with an extension of the SPS mechanisms to Mediterranean crops; 
the new Commissioner, Mariann Fischer Boel, spent much of 2005 pushing for sugar reform; 
and Member States were busy implementing the SPS. 
But the UK was agitating for more, and attempted to trigger a new CAP reform debate 
in 2005 as Member States tried to decide on the size, and scope, of the EU’s budget (its 
Financial Perspective) for 2007-2013. In particular, at the European Council meeting in June 
2005, the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, appeared to be saying that the UK would be 
                                                 
1 Official Journal of the European Union, L270, 21 October 2003. 6 
 
willing to give up its budget rebate, first negotiated in 1984, in exchange for a sizeable cut in 
the  CAP  budget  (Agra  Europe,  24  June  2005:  EP/5-EP/7).  Speaking  to  journalists, 
Commission President José Manuel Barroso noted the commitment for a mid-term review of 
the SPS in 2008 (ibid., EP/7). As the debate intensified, French President Jacques Chirac was 
characteristically  staunch  in  his  defence  of  the  CAP  in  refusing  the  British  ‘offer’  (Agra 
Europe, 15 July 2005). The need for further CAP reform was widely debated, not least in the 
Financial Times. Bertie Ahern (2005), the Irish Prime Minster, in September 2005 argued 
that, as well a being ‘unwise and unfair to ask farmers to accept another radical reform now’, 
tactically it would ‘handicap the EU’ in the forthcoming WTO negotiations in Hong Kong, 
and  ‘remove  the  motive  for  other  big  food  producers  to  move  towards  reform  of  their 
agricultural sectors.’ 
The 2007-2013 Financial Perspective was eventually agreed at the European Council 
in December 2005, with: i) the British rebate more-or-less intact; ii) no CAP reform, but a 
much  reduced  budget  for  Pillar  2  expenditure;  and  iii)  the  Commission  being  asked  ‘to 
undertake a full, wide ranging review covering all aspects of EU spending, including the 
CAP,  and  of  resources,  including  the  UK  rebate,  to  report  in  2008/9’  (Council  of  the 
European Union, 2005, paragraph 80). But just before this decision had been reached, the UK 
Government published a document setting out its Vision for the CAP (HM Treasury & Defra 
2005); which prompted a caustic response from Mariann Fischer Boel, and her comment that: 
‘There will be full debate on the future direction of the CAP, before the end of the current 
budget period in 2013. And we have already programmed a health check for the reforms in 
2008  to  2009’  (as  quoted  in  Agra  Europe,  9  December  2005:  EP/7;  emphasis  added). 
However it was not until June 2006 that Agra Europe began to make regular use of the term 
‘Health  Check’  (9  June  2006:  EP/1).  Later  the  Commissioner  was  to  talk  about  the 
Commission proceeding on the basis of  ‘one vision, two steps’. First there would be the 
Health Check; and second ‘a look ahead to the CAP after 2013, within a general review of the 
European Union budget’ (Fischer Boel, 2007). 
Had the Treaty of Lisbon been ratified as planned then, from 1 January 2009, the 
European Parliament would have gained enhanced co-decision rights over the CAP, sharing 
decision-making  with  the  Council.  This,  it  was  thought,  would  encourage  the  Council  to 
conclude its deliberations on the Health Check before the end of 2008. Failure to do so would 
have opened up the debate in the European Parliament, and with elections to the Parliament 
pending in summer 2009, progress on the Health Check package could have been delayed 
until autumn 2009. Ireland’s referendum has at best delayed, if not de-railed, ratification of 
the Lisbon Treaty, and thus removed one reason for concluding the Health Check debate this 
year. However the French Presidency of the Council has declared its intent to conclude the 
discussions in November: to do so will depend on its willingness and ability to put forward a 
Presidency Compromise acceptable to the Commission and a qualified majority of Member 
States. Given, as argued below, that the Commission’s proposals are probably more radical 7 
 
than  at  first  supposed,  and  that  some  Member  States  (including  France)  have  important 
reservations about some aspects, the outcome is a little uncertain. 
As well as elections to the European Parliament, a new College of Commissioners will 
be appointed in 2009. Thus from the early summer through to the autumn both Parliament and 
Commission will be embroiled in change, and the parliamentary hearings to approve the new 
Commission President and Commissioners. It seems unlikely that any substantive discussion 
on the mandate given by the European Council in December 2005 (‘to undertake a full, wide 
ranging review covering all aspects of EU spending, including the CAP, and of resources, 
including the UK rebate’) can really begin until late 2009; and whether Mariann Fischer Boel 
will then be Commissioner for Agriculture is unclear. 
 
The Health Check proposal: unambitious? 
In the run-up to the November 2007 launch of the Health Check the Commission had 
been keen to suggest that the forthcoming review of the CAP would be technical in character, 
focusing on simplification. No-doubt it was keen to dispel fears in the farming community 
that this ‘mid-term review’, like its predecessor under Franz Fischler, would turn into a major 
CAP reform. Major changes to the policy, it was hinted, would only arise in the context of the 
budget debate, to be launched in 2009, on the Financial Perspective post 2013.  
In launching the debate on the Health Check in November 2007 the Commission said:  
The 2003 Reform was the first step to make the CAP fit for the 21st century. 
Consensus on all the elements of the 2003 Reform could not be reached in one go. 
Indeed,  this  is  why  a  number  of  review  clauses  were  …  foreseen  in  the  final 
agreement … . These review clauses, without implying a fundamental reform of 
the  existing  policies,  allow  the  possibility  of  further  adjustments  in  line  with 
market and other developments (Commission of the European Communities, 2007: 
3). 
One  way  in  which  circumstances  had  changed  since  2003  was  that  world  market 
prices for oil, metals, and agricultural commodities were much higher than they had been. 
Export subsidies on dairy products had not been used since June 2007, and intervention stocks 
were  depleted.  Thus  in  its  formal  Health  Check  proposals  in  May  2008  the  Commission 
concluded that ‘that any remaining supply controls of the CAP (namely, dairy quotas and set-
aside) should be removed’ (Commission of the European Communities, 2008a). 
  Despite the Commission’s desire to postpone discussion of more substantial reform 
until 2009, it could be argued that the Health Check proposals are rather more ambitious than 
might have been expected. As widely leaked beforehand, the Commission used this occasion 
to announce that it will not propose an extension of the milk quota regime beyond 2015, and it 
has suggested  a  gradual increase in quota in the interim to prepare the sector  for  a ‘soft 8 
 
landing’. It has proposed a further shift of funds away from the SPS to Pillar 2; but the system 
of ‘modulation’ it favours taxes more heavily larger farm businesses, making this a politically 
sensitive  issue  in  some  member  states.  It  wants  a  simplification  of  the  SPS,  including 
abolition of the set-aside requirement (popular amongst farmers because of soaring world 
market prices, but problematic to environmentalists), a shift to fully decoupled SPS payments 
for some specific crop payment schemes, and a substantial reduction in the partial decoupling 
option, particularly for arable crops, that had been favoured by France and other southern 
Member States. Intervention mechanisms would also be weakened. 
  In promoting the package to the European Association of Agricultural Economists, the 
Commissioner’s  Deputy  Head  of  Cabinet  suggested  that  whilst  ‘better  regulation  and 
simplification’ was an important political priority, so too was a move ‘towards more market 
orientation’ and competitiveness. For this a key aspect was 
decoupling of farmers’ support from production decisions. Decoupling allows EU 
farmers to make their choices in response to market signals … . It brings EU 
agriculture much closer to world market [sic] without distorting them because of 
their  Green  Box  compatibility  …  .  …  keeping  some  arable  payments  partially 
coupled has brought no market benefits but has added red tape. In this sector and 
several others, it’s time to phase in full decoupling (Borchardt, 2008: 2, 4). 
  But if the Commission has proposed a moderately ambitious package, what prospects 
are there for its adoption? There is some difficulty addressing this issue in a paper written in 
September 2008, for presentation at a conference in November, given that it is hoped that the 
Agriculture Council can agree the package in its meeting scheduled for 17/18 November. 
 
Budget constraints? 
The  CAP  reform  decisions  of  June  2003  were  taken  in  the  context  of  a  budget 
framework agreed in October 2002, and lasting beyond the Financial Perspective 2000 – 
2006  through  to  2013  (see  Swinbank  &  Daugbjerg,  2006).  Although  this  did  not  create 
immediate financial problems for the CAP, with increased expenditures on direct payments in 
the new Member States there was some concern that CAP budget constraints would tighten by 
the end of the decade. According, Article 11 of the SPS regulation (1782/2003) included a 
Financial Discipline under which, on an annual basis from 2007, the Council was mandated 
to  reduce  the  direct  payments  if  there  was  likely  to  be  any  breech  of  the  annual  budget 
ceilings set in October 2002. Enlargement proceeded as planned, with increasing levels of 
expenditures on direct payments in the new Member States, and new compensation payments 
have been brought into the SPS, but there has been no need to invoke the Financial Discipline. 
Indeed, as a result of high world market prices, expenditure on export subsidies and 
intervention purchases has fallen away sharply, and there have been competing claims put 9 
 
forward for appropriating the ‘unspent’ CAP money: on extra support to farmers in the new 
Member  States  for  example,  or  for  agricultural  development  in  the  Third  World  (Agra 
Europe, 20 June 2008: EP/2). Thus the Health Check is not being discussed at a time of CAP 
budget  crisis.  Its  proposals  would  not  reduce  CAP  expenditure;  although  a  result  of  its 
proposals on ‘modulation’ would be the redirection of funds from Pillar 1 to Pillar 2 and this 
would  increase  overall  EU  taxpayer  expenditure  on  agricultural  support  because  of  the 
requirement on Member States to co-finance Pillar 2.  
In March 2007 the European Council had agreed that 20% of EU energy supplies 
should  come  from  renewable  sources  by  2020  (excluding  nuclear  power),  and  that  a 
mandatory minimum 10% blend of biofuels would be used by all Member States in ‘transport 
petrol and diesel’ by 2020 (Council of the European Union, 2007). With a world ‘food crisis’ 
apparently looming, these and other biofuel policies worldwide were increasingly seen as 
problematic.  Responding to these concerns in an open letter to his colleagues on the ECOFIN 
Council, just before the Commission tabled its Health Check proposals, Britain’s Chancellor 
of the Exchequer proposed, inter alia, ‘a fundamental reform of Europe’s agricultural sector’ 
including ‘phasing out of all elements of the CAP that are designed to keep EU agricultural 
prices above world market levels’ and ‘an end to direct payments to EU farmers’; and ‘a close 
examination  of  the  direct  and  indirect  effects  of  EU  biofuels  policy,  including  a  full 
assessment of its effect on food prices …’ (Darling, 2008). From the other extreme the French 
response to high world food prices seemed to be to defend the CAP. For example the French 
Agriculture Minister Michel Barnier, interviewed by the Financial Times (28 April 2008: 1), 
had suggested that the CAP was a good model for others to follow: ‘It is a policy that allows 
us to produce to feed ourselves’. 
The Health Check is of course not unrelated to the budget, but it is certainly not driven 
by a budgetary constraint. However, the budget may have played an unexpected role in the 
Health Check. The 2005 debate over the 2007-2013 Financial Perspective, with the UK’s 
persistent calls for CAP reform, might explain why the Commission upgraded the level of 
ambition in its Health Check proposals, whilst insisting that any substantive discussion on the 
CAP after 2013 should form part of the 2009 budget review.  
 
WTO pressures? 
Whether or not motivated by the desire to make progress in the Doha Round, the June 
2003  reform  package,  with  the  associated  commitment  to  extend  its  ‘objectives  and  … 
approach’  to  ‘the  so-called  Mediterranean  products,  such  as  olive  oil,  tobacco  or  cotton’ 
(Council of the European Union, 2003: 2), was an important step in the EU’s approach to the 
Doha Round. Most importantly the SPS (when ‘fully’ decoupled) shifted the bulk of blue box, 
and some amber box, support to the green box; and it gave the EU some scope to negotiate 10 
 
tariff and export subsidy reductions on dairy products. Nonetheless Swinbank and Tranter 
(2005) questioned whether the SPS met all the requirements of the green box. 
  One concern was addressed by the 2007 fruit and vegetable reform, which removes 
(from 2010) the planting restrictions on SPS land that might otherwise have been challenged 
in a manner analogous to the problems the US faced over Upland Cotton.
2 The fruit and 
vegetable  reform  also  removed  the  processing  aids  previously  paid  on  various  processed 
products,  channelling  the  budget  funds  into  increased  SPS  payments  for  the  growers 
concerned (European Commission, 2007). Had the processing aids remained in place, the EU 
could  have  been  vulnerable  to  a  WTO  challenge  that  they  fell  foul  of  the  Agreement  on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, being Prohibited Subsidies ‘contingent … upon the 
use of domestic over imported goods’. 
In 2005 the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body ruled that the EU had subsidised its 
export of sugar to a greater extent than was allowed, and the EU agreed to respect the ruling 
and bring its exports into line with its export subsidy commitment. This involved eliminating 
the export of so-called C sugar, and severely cutting back on the volume of sugar exported 
with payment of export subsidies. It did so by reducing EU production, as a result of a quota 
buy-out scheme that was facilitated, in part, by a phased 36% reduction in the support price. 
Political agreement on the sugar reform was achieved in November 2005, just ahead of the 
WTO Ministerial in Hong  Kong, allowing Mariann Fischer  Boel to suggest that the deal 
would strengthen the EU’s negotiating position in Hong Kong as it ‘demonstrated that the EU 
could tackle one of the bastions of its common agricultural policy as well as respect WTO 
rulings’ (as quoted in the Financial Times, 25 November 2005: 10). Although some progress 
was  made  in  Hong  Kong    –it  was  agreed,  for  example,  that  export  subsidies  would  be 
eliminated  by  2013  if  an  overall  agreement  could  be  achieved–    it  was  not  sufficient  to 
conclude the Doha Round, and the negotiations limped on. 
By the time the Doha talks entered a deep freeze in July 2008 the EU had come a long 
way from its position in January 2003 when it had indicated only a very limited willingness to 
engage in reductions in domestic support, export subsidies and import protection. As well as 
the elimination of export subsidies by 2013 (which the EU had first accepted in May 2004), 
Crawford Falconer’s draft Modalities envisaged tariff cuts of about 70% in the highest tariff 
band  (although  the  detail  of  Special  Safeguard  mechanisms,  sensitive  product  status,  and 
safeguards on preference erosion, significantly complicate the picture). It also envisaged a 
70% reduction in the EU’s Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS), and individual AMS 
product caps; a 75 to 80% reduction in a new aggregate measure of Overall Trade-Distorting 
Support (OTDS); and a capping of blue box expenditure at 2.5% of the average total value of 
agricultural production in a 1995-2000 base period (WTO, 2008; Swinbank, forthcoming).  
                                                 
2 However potential problems remain because the SPS is an annual payment, to farmers, who have to have the 
land at their disposal in ‘agricultural’ production, and cross compliance applies.  11 
 
Whether this package would have proved acceptable to its trading partners had the 
negotiations progressed is unclear; but what is evident is that the green box status of the SPS 
is crucial for the EU’s acceptance of the proposed AMS, OTDS, and blue box reductions. Is 
the Health Check in any way associated with this; or is it unrelated to the WTO? 
It must be conceded that the Commission’s November 2007 communication contains 
neither the place-name ‘Doha’ nor the acronym ‘WTO’, although in the introduction to its 
legislative  proposals  of  May  2008  the  Commission  does  refer  to  the  WTO  twice:  once 
explaining the 2003 reform (‘The main objective was providing a direct payment system that 
allows farmers to be market oriented, as simple as possible from an administrative point of 
view and compatible with WTO’), and second the need to respect green box provisions if a 
relaxation of the Article 69 rules were to allow Member States more spending discretion 
(Commission  of  the  European  Communities,  2008a:  5,  6).  However,  the  Health  Check 
proposals, and the emerging Doha package, are both moving in the same direction. 
Klaus-Dieter Borchardt (2008) drew attention to the proposal for ‘further decoupling’, 
moving from a situation in which some arable payments were ‘partially coupled’ by phasing 
in ‘full decoupling’. As the EU has not made a declaration to the WTO of its domestic support 
levels since the introduction of the SPS it is a little difficult to judge how it plans to declare its 
direct payments, or how other WTO Members might react. It seems fairly certain that the EU 
will declare the bulk of SPS expenditure in the green box; but how will partially coupled 
payments be declared? Presumably the partially coupled part (for example 25% of the old 
arable  payment  in  France)  will  remain  in  the  blue  box.  But  can  partially  coupled  SPS 
payments be split between the green and blue boxes; or does partial coupling imply that the 
whole of the partially coupled SPS payment should remain in the blue box (all the old arable 
payment  in  France  for  example)?  And  might  concerns  of  this  sort  have  prompted  the 
Commission’s quest for full decoupling in the Health Check? 
Borchardt  (2008:  5)  also  noted  the  ambition  of  the  Health  Check  to  weaken  the 
remaining elements of market price support: ‘Market orientation further needs the conversion 
of our traditional market instruments, like intervention, private storage, export refunds and 
quotas, into a genuine safety net. These instruments should not be applied any more as “price 
setters” on the markets but as instruments that keep farmers in business in case of dramatic 
market disruptions’. The recent world market price spikes, and the expectation that prices will 
continue at higher levels than prevailed in the early 2000s, have meant that CAP market price 
support is not currently important for most commodities. Whilst this situation prevails, the EU 
can  agree  to  the  elimination  of  export  subsidies  and  to  substantial  reductions  in  import 
protection, without serious erosion of EU market prices. But, if world market prices were to 
revert to previous levels, the Falconer package would limit the EU’s ability to maintain its 
traditional  levels  of  market  price  support.  Thus  yet  again  the  Health  Check  proposals  to 
weaken  market  price  support  mechanisms  could  be  seen  as  an  important  element  in  the 
Commission’s Doha strategy. 12 
 
If the Doha package was to be agreed it would ‘lock-in’ the CAP reforms the EU has 
agreed to-date. If the Doha Round is not concluded the WTO system, with its existing URAA, 
will  continue  to  apply,  and  aspects  of  the  present  CAP  could  be  challenged  (Swinbank, 
forthcoming).  Paradoxically,  the  green  box  status  of  the  SPS  would  not,  in  these 
circumstances, be particularly problematic, as the blue box and the EU’s AMS allowance are 
sufficiently commodious. But without leverage from the WTO, it is unclear whether budget or 
other ‘internal’ concerns would be sufficiently powerful to drive further CAP reform, or even 
prevent backsliding towards the ‘old’ CAP. 
 
Paradigm shift? 
Although we agree with Coleman, Grant and Josling (2004, 106) when they argue that 
the competitive agriculture paradigm had ‘… became globally institutionalized in the set of 
rules found in the WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture’, this does not imply that the EU had 
uniformly embraced the market liberal paradigm and rejected CAP support. Indeed a range of 
views is current, as noted earlier, stretching from those of the UK’s Alistair Darling through 
to  Ireland’s  Bertie Ahern and  France’s Michel  Barnier. This uneasy truce, we believe, is 
constrained by the EU’s international commitments, and aspirations, in the WTO.  
As suggested earlier, the driving force behind the Health Check reform may be the 
cumulative paradigm shift from the state-assisted to the multifunctional policy paradigm. But 
how robust is this argument on paradigm change? Did a genuine paradigm shift really take 
place in the 2003 reform? In 2003 there was no intention of redistributing support to farmers 
according to the level of public goods produced. Neither the historical nor the regionalised 
mode of transforming the area and headage payments into SPS payments linked them to the 
production  of  public  goods.  A  true  shift  to  the  multifunctional  paradigm  would,  to  a 
considerable  extent,  imply  that  payments  would  be  much  more  directly  related  to  the 
provision  of  public  goods.  Thus,  there  is  some  evidence  to  suggest  that  the  rhetoric  of 
multifunctionality in 2003 was just the state-assisted paradigm dressed up in different clothes. 
Both  the  Health  Check  and  the  recent  world  commodity  price  spikes  pose  further 
challenges  to  the  argument  that  the  multifunctional  paradigm  has  set  the  direction  for 
cumulative reform of the CAP. With the rise in world commodity prices the EU abolished the 
set-aside requirement for 2007/08, and in the Health Check abolition of set-aside has been 
proposed (and will likely be agreed). Thus set-aside’s prime policy objective is revealed as a 
supply  control  mechanism,  not  an  environmental  goal,  and  when  market  circumstances 
changed European agriculture was to be released from restrictive provisions (although we do 
concede that the Commission has proposed some measures that aim to retain some of the 
environmental benefits of set-aside). Faced with a very wet harvest in England in 2008, the 
Good Agricultural and Environmental Condition (part of the SPS cross compliance package) 
restriction on taking motorised vehicles onto waterlogged soils was lifted to allow the harvest 13 
 
to be completed (Agra Europe, 12 September 2008: N/2). As an Agra Europe (11 July 2008: 
A1-2) editorial had earlier opined,  
A growing school of thought took the view that the CAP was evolving, slowly but 
inexorably,  into  a  European  rural  policy  which  would  have  an  increasingly 
significant agri-environmental component. In the future, the prevailing wisdom 
ran, farmers would be paid as much for their role as custodians of the countryside 
as for their role as providers of food. But with prices for most types of food having 
risen sharply in recent times, the notion that the farmer of the future will be some 
kind of large-scale park keeper now looks distinctly fanciful.  
  Although  the  incomes  of  many  farm  businesses  have  been  much  improved  as  a 
consequence of higher world market prices
3, undermining the need for the SPS to provide 
income support, the Member States have not shown much enthusiasm for the Commission’s 
proposal to shift more funds from Pillar 1 to Pillar 2 (Buckwell, 2008: A/1);  such a shift 
would be a strong indicator that the CAP is indeed moving towards more multifunctionalism 
because Pillar 2 is where member states could better address the EU’s environmental and 
rural development concerns. The income support offered by the SPS was in the past justified 
as  compensation  to  European  farmers  for  the  extra  costs  they  incurred  for  delivering  a 
multifunctional agriculture. But if the market is now returning higher prices to farmers, why 
do they also need income support?  
Moreover, in explaining the Health Check package to the European Association of 
Agricultural Economists, the Farm Commissioner’s Deputy Head of Cabinet, Klaus-Dieter 
Borchardt,  emphasised  more  than  once  that  agriculture  needs  protection  because  it  is  a 
vulnerable sector, dependent on climate and soil and its major production factor, land, is 
immobile (notes taken by the authors, August 2008). This is exactly the defining feature of 
the state-assisted policy paradigm which holds that the farming industry is different from 
most  economic  sectors  in  modern  societies,  subject  to  unstable  weather  and  market 
conditions, which are beyond the control of the individual farmer (Skogstad 1998). Borchardt 
seems to imply that the state-assisted paradigm, rather than multifunctionalism, still forms the 
underpinning  of  the  CAP.  Had  there  been  an  earlier  move  towards  multifunctionalism,  it 




                                                 
3 The world commodity price boom did of course impact farm costs as well as revenues (fuel, fertilizers, animal 
feed, etc.), and not all farms were in a position to sell at the price spikes, and so the impact on farm incomes was 
uneven with some farms failing to benefit from the price boom. Similarly these other costs (tinplate, fuel, etc.) 
are reflected in retail food prices; but the extent of food price inflation has generated new concerns, and led the 
Commission to establish a task force ‘to examine the functioning of the food supply chain’ (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2008b: 10). 14 
 
Concluding comments 
Although the bitter debate in 2005 over the 2006-2013 Financial Perspective possibly 
influenced  the  Commission’s  approach  to  the  policy  reviews  built  into  the  2003  Fischler 
reform package, the Health Check was not about the budget. The budget debate demanded by 
the UK had been deferred to 2009, or later; there was no immediate budget crisis; and the 
Health Check proposals would simply reallocate the CAP budget between Pillars 1 and 2. 
  Instead, the primary goal of the Health Check was to move European agriculture onto 
a  more  competitive  footing,  more  compatible  with  any  likely  Doha  agreement;  and,  with 
buoyant  world  market  prices,  to  release  the  productive  potential  of  European  agriculture 
through  the  abolition  of  set-aside  and  milk  quotas.  Suggestions  that  EU  farm  policy  was 
underpinned by the ‘multifunctional’ paradigm were thus eroded. Thus in the run-up to the 
2009  budget  review  the  future  of  the  CAP  is  again  contested,  with  some  member  states 
espousing the competitive agriculture paradigm (the UK Treasury for example) and others the 
state-assisted, or dependent agriculture, paradigm (e.g. the French Ministry of Agriculture).  
With the Doha Round and the Health Check still not concluded, a number of questions 
remain unanswered. Will the Health Check facilitate completion of the Doha Round, or  –in 
the case of a Doha failure, and with no Peace Clause in place–  will it better equip the CAP to 
withstand further attack in Dispute Settlement proceedings? And what role will the WTO play 
in  the  2009  budget  review,  and  the  shape  of  the  CAP  post-2013?  Without  a  final  Doha 
agreement  in  place  there  is  no  external  constraint  to  lock-in  the  decoupling  of  EU  farm 
support achieved between 2003 and 2008. How this will play out on the CAP in the future is 
too soon to say, but there is a risk that the CAP will backtrack to a pre-2003 version. 
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